April 30th., 2004

The last chapter of the RR

• The opposition agrees to accept the new scenario in the rocky road of the RR.

• The progressive deterioration of the regime and its overt will not to abide by an apparent democracy.

• Before the legitimate SC decision regarding the RR, the government chose to ignore it.

• The OAS and The Carter Center pressed the DCG.

• The NEC and Constitutional Hall excesses have crossed the yellow line.

• The assault upon the Supreme Court.

• The independence of the judicial power and the rule of law has died.  This is the end of democracy.

• Chávez attempts to maintain control of total power.

• Venezuela is facing a heroic challenge –almost impossible- to dispose of Chávez through peaceful means.

• Between Castro and Chávez there is more than a solid alliance.

• Venezuelan oil has been the lifesaver of the Cuban Revolution.

• Chávez has Castro’s power structure and daily advise at his service.

• U. S. electoral campaigning contributes to stripping Chávez before the international community.

• “Chávez’s government should be dealt with as a hostile and unfriendly regime.”

• The ties between Chávez and Castro are a matter of concern.

• Chávez’s stand before international terrorism is questioned.  Venezuelan cooperation in the campaign vs. terrorism has been inconsistent.

• Chávez attempts to intrigue vs. Spain’s new government.

• He strengthen his verbal offensive vs. Aznar and praises Rodríguez Zapatero.

• Venezuelans trust that Spain’s foreign policy shall continue to prioritize the promotion and defense of democratic values.

• Venezuela on the edge. 

The last blow to the country’s precarious institutionality could be the consequence of the last witnessing  of support for the electoral path given to Chávez by the opposition.  They agreed to face the legal processes objecting the signatures which –on December last- demanded the scheduling of the RR challenging the presidential mandate.  The NEC –under Chavista control- decided anew, that signatures were not valid and proposed such a complex mechanism with such limitations, that a new recollection of signatures seemed impossible.  Notwithstanding, three and a half citizens filled out the forms complying with all NEC requirements.

These processes –perhaps- constitute the last station in the way of the cross of the RR.  In May, 2002, pressed by imposing demonstrations, as well as by the OAS, UNPD, Carter Center and the Group of Friendly Nations (Brazil, Chile, Mexico, US, Portugal and Spain), Chávez accepted holding the RR towards the end of 2003.  In Venezuela Today we have reported and analyzed the numerous obstacles by Chávez.  The last are these legal processes.

In our reports we’ve examined the growing deterioration of Chávez’s regime and his overt will not to submit himself to an apparent democracy.  Throughout these five years he has experienced the loss of support in the National Assembly to the point of reaching a precarious minority.  At the Supreme Court, ten of its twenty justices took an independent posture and refused to take orders from Miraflores.  The new correlation of forces at the SC determined that Penal and Electoral Halls brought up decisions rubbing the Lt. Col. the wrong way.  The most significant being the one by Electoral Hall attesting to the legitimacy of the constitutional quorum (20 % of the electorate) and dictating the calling for the RR.  Such decision placed the regime before the choice of abiding or ignoring the SC sentence.  It chose contempt with the support of Constitutional Hall, where it still maintains the unconditional loyalty of three magistrates.

The DCG decided to participate in the processes as it understands it is an opportunity for an energized mobilization of the citizenry claiming for a peaceful, electoral solution to the crisis.  It did so in spite of the fraudulent machinery Chavismo has at the NEC which only recognized 55 % of valid signatures while 34 % were placed under processes mentioned above.  11 % were labeled invalid with no reasonable explanations, in violation of the universal right of due process.

In a way, the DCG made the decision under pressure of recommendations from the OAS and the Carter Center who offered the presence of Gaviria, Carter and numerous international observers as a buffer of the Chavista threats to stop petitioners from ratifying their signatures.

CHÁVEZ ONTO TOTAL POWER

For opposition spokespeople, NEC and Constitutional Hall excesses represent the crossing of the yellow line in the zigzagging path of violations of the rule of law characterizing  the regime.  It appears like Chávez is ready to cross the red line.

In three sessions of on-going twenty hours, with simultaneous  incorporation of principals and deputies while stopping opposition assemblypeople to make use of their rights, the National Assembly passed a Supreme Court Organic Law, increasing its number of magistrates to 32.  To avoid opposition interventions they reduced down a project from 132 to 23 articles, many of which have texts six to seven pages long.  Officialdom parliamentarians added an article allowing them to indefinitely suspend those members of SC in disagreement with the Executive.  It is worth adding that, in keeping with the Constitution, passing this law, due to its organic nature, required the support of a qualified majority and the designation of new magistrates is also subject to the same requisite.  Now, in spite of the Constitution, their election shall be by a simple majority.

The new SC guarantees control of all its Halls for the regime, as well as that of the whole of judicial posts, where on a daily basis, judges are fired for daring to make decisions dissatisfying to the government.  “The independence of the judicial power and the rule of law are dead.  It is the end of democracy.” These are not exaggerated words to evaluate the impact of this legislation.

Together with this new SC legislation there is the NEC resolution authorizing the revoking of the mandate of 15 opposition and only 2 officialdom assemblypeople.  If it is finally accepted the regime would have regained a wide majority in Parliament, total control of judicial power and it shall keep the control it already has over the Attorney General’s Office, Controller and the People’s Defense Offices .

Chávez has also proclaimed  that he’ll win the governorships and mayoralties now in opposition hands in forthcoming regional elections.  However, opponents are gearing up for a new battle.  Some in the media have compared it to Churchill’s case when England had to deal with Hitler.  The opposition calls for participation in the challenging electoral processes with the conviction that it can mobilize over the 500,000 required signatures, so that on 8 August –established date for the RR- Venezuela faces a heroic (almost impossible) quest to peacefully dispose of Chávez.

CHÁVEZ AND U. S. ELECTIONS

The iron law of Latin American militarism has been its inexorable slide towards authoritarian schemes which –almost always- end up in cruel dictatorships.  This is the history of most of the XX Century.  Barely, in the last decade of the century, peoples of the region manage to impose rulers of electoral origins, except in Cuba.  Today, Cuba remains, together with Venezuela, targets observed by the international community as moles on the map of a Continent shaken by serious social problems but refusing to abandon civilized forms of government.

Between Castro and Chávez, there is more than a solid alliance.  It is the predominance of their power madness against the interests of the peoples they rule.  For the Cuban Comandante, Venezuelan oil became a genuine lifesaver in tough times suffered by the island  due to the end of Soviet patronage.  For Chávez, the arrangement means having access to Castro’s power structure and his daily advise.  Beyond the alliance, Chávez believes he is Castro’s heir, while the former supports him as the leader best in tune with his ideas and purposes.

The U. S. electoral campaign again shows the weight of public opinion on foreign policy.  To the extent in which the Chávez administration -already transformed into a clear military rule- adopts massive repressive practices of past military dictatorships.  U. S. voters react upon knowing that human rights violations in Venezuela include political assassinations, torture, vanished people, illegal imprisonment and impunity covering abuses by officialdom, as well as, using judges and “revolutionary” prosecutors to harass and persecute opponents.  Electorate reaction has been stirred by media reports which frequently comment the Venezuelan Case, especially, the witnessing in TV News of horrible scenes of police repression.  Congress people, in electoral fray have had to look at the Venezuelan drama:  those with a Hispanic constituency have shown special interest.

The recent trip to Venezuela by Senator Bill Nelson allowed him to air the other issue regarding Chávez in the international community:  his support for the Colombian guerrilla.  In an interview with Venezuela’s Foreign Minister, he said to have complete information –including intelligence data- about Chávez’s help to subversive elements in the neighboring country.  Back in Miami, the Senator said:  “the Chávez government should be dealt with as a hostile, unfriendly regime.”  He told Colombian media he had evidence that Chávez gives passports to Colombian guerrillas so that they may freely move throughout Venezuelan territory.  “The situation in Venezuela is worrisome because of Chávez’s ties with Fidel Castro and the FARC guerrilla.”

The most serious of questions before Chávez is his ambiguous position on international terrorism as voiced in The State Department Annual Report –“Patterns of Global Terrorism 2003”- made public this week.  “Venezuela’s cooperation in the international campaign vs. terrorism was inconsistent in 2003,” indicated the report.  It adds that “Islamic radical agents” are operating within Venezuelan territory.  The document underscores the question of the Colombian narcoguerrilla, of the “the ideological affinity” between Chávez, FARC and ELN, “guerrilla forces who frequently travel through the borders while considering Venezuelan turf as their refuge.”  The forthcoming U. S. elections are making possible to look at Chávez indeed as a new breed of South American “Gorilla,” rather than a harmless “road nut.”

ILLUSSIONS OF CHÁVEZ ABOUT RODRÍGUEZ ZAPATERO

Chávez gave up his crazy attempt to influence U. S. elections.  Now, his psychopathic personality leads to connive regarding Spain’s new government.  Since elections in March he has intensified his old verbal offensive vs. Aznar and he showers Rodríguez Zapatero with praise, while expecting from him “a policy of solidarity with the peoples in this continent struggling vs. savage capitalism imposed on us by U. S. imperialism and out of respect for our sovereignty.”  Until now Spanish Socialists have refused to voice opinions on Venezuela, in spite of Spanish and Venezuelan media requests on the subject.  Notwithstanding, Venezuelans trust that Spanish foreign policy will keep prioritizing the promotion and defense of democratic values in Latin America and that Spain will continue to support efforts of Friendly Countries –of which it is part- towards the electoral solution of the crisis.

Venezuelans trust the friendly ear by Madrid for the viewpoint of a million immigrants and children of Spanish immigrants who have kept denouncing the situation in the country, while pointing to why tens of thousands have been forced to go back to Spain.  The new administration and PSOE keep a discreet silence.  But both government and party positions have been assigned to leaders knowledgeable of the Venezuelan situation, who are aware of the significant role Spain must keep on playing in the promotion of an urgent, electoral solution to avoid the spiral of violence in a country with such a sizable immigrant population and so many important Spanish businesses and investments.

Venezuela Today believes it mirrors the national sentiment that we are reaching the edge:  the appearance of new forms of violence; the consolidation of a mask less dictatorship or a difficult recovery of democracy.