June 30th., 2004

International Observers

Abstract:

·         The RR has been called, although Chávez always discarded its possibility.

• The OAS and The Carter Center played a major role in the acknowledgement of the challenges results.
• This is why observer rules were changed.
• Officialdom is trying to avoid the presence of The OAS.
• Chávez says he accepts the challenge and is campaigning fulltime.
• There is a delay regarding the RR chronogram.
• Chávez doling out dollars left and right aims at modifying the majority against him.
• Postponing the recall or Chávez’s resignation in a fraudulent maneuver, shall not be discarded.
• Oil revenues are being transferred directly to the government to be used for electoral goals.
• 2 billion Venezuelan petrodollars to take care of plans and missions with which Chávez favors voters.
• Identity documents and naturalizations galore for undocumented people.
• Problems at The Electoral Registry.
• The obscure issue of the voting machines.
• Obstacles vs. the RR participation by hundreds of thousands of Venezuelan residents abroad.
• Charges on the parallel operation of the NEC.
• The NEC President is a candidate as Justice of the Supreme Court.
• According to Miguel Ángel Rodríguez, new OAS Secretary general, this body shall offer assurances towards a legitimate realization of the RR.
• Chávez cannot keep international observers out.
• They will be decisive to stop the ghost of violence and the feared bloodbath.

The National Electoral Council (NEC) last 3 June, announced that the opposition had obtained the necessary signatures to activate the revoking referendum (RR).  Five days later, Francisco Carrasquero –president of the institution- informed that the revoking process would take place on 15 August.  It is proper to remember.  The time given to the opposition to ratify signatures of petitioners of the RR would end on 31 May.  Until that day, it seemed clear that there would be no RR.  Chávez always discarded the possibility and the official NEC majority acted in strict compliance with instructions from the Comandante.

What happened?  The OAS and The Carter Center monitored the challenges while gathering evidence that on Sunday the 30^th , the constitutional quorum was fulfilled.  Due to opposition charges, Carter went to NEC quarters and witnessed the stoppage in its computers, a signal that something was “fishy…” –an attempt to ignore results-.  Hours later Carter told Chávez that both The Carter Center and The OAS had the numbers from the challenges which they would make public in a timely fashion, and that he expected these not to differ notoriously from those released by the NEC.  Gaviria, on his part, let it be known that information on the challenges process he intended to present to the forthcoming Quito Assembly.  Chávez understood the message.  Ignoring the challenges process was becoming a strong argument for the OAS to take hold of the threat of the Inter American Democratic Charter as Damocles Sword.  Both Carter and Gaviria on the evening of Sunday the 30^th , observed an eloquent spectacle.  They told Chávez that had tried –unsuccessfully- to get a hold of Carrasquero:  Chávez lifted a telephone, dialed a number and spoke briefly.  He hung up and informed Carter and Gaviria that Carrasquero would receive them early in the morning the next day.

Venezuela is at the doors of the RR.  International observers have played a leading role in this process.  Equally so, Venezuelans have been at the vanguard while facing and overcoming countless hurdles.  One of the first steps taken by the NEC regarding the recall was a change of rules on observers.  It dictated  regulations, which if applied, would make their presence null.  These norms are targeting The OAS:  Chávez does not want international observers, even though he should be the most interested in their        being present.  In the conditions of the RR, nobody, neither in Venezuela nor abroad, will give credit to results favorable to Chávez, unless these are convincingly backed  by international observers.

CHÁVEZ’S CAMPAIGN

Last June the 3^rd., the NEC announced that the opposition had submitted the necessary signatures to hold the RR.  That very evening Chávez began his campaign fulltime.  Notwithstanding, his men at the NEC have paralyzed the normal operation of this body and the delay is clear in the chronogram to fulfill the announced date.  If the RR is not realized before 19 August, it would go against the end for which it was called.  Even if the majority of citizens would support the recall, there would be no election for Chávez’s succession.  For the remaining of the term hisVicepresident -or whomever he would choose- would assume the post.

The dual game between Chávez’s speech and the role of his people at the NEC is linked to a strategic design.  The recollection of signatures and the challenges process showed the strength of the opposition.  From the other angle, the impact of the so-called “missions,” –by which Chávez appears daily in radio and TV broadcast networks, doling out petrodollars among diverse electoral constituencies.  Chávez’s popularity grows, but the country remains divided into two blocs and those who are critical still bear more weight.  Private polls, whose credibility is enriched by their success in previous elections, keep offering a scenario of opinion vs. Chávez.  If this scenario holds in July, the NEC will do everything possible to postpone the RR or Chávez shall skew the recall by resigning.  This will provoke a presidential election within thirty days, where he believes to have the advantage of competing vs. several opposition candidates.  It would be one of the worst constitutional frauds, but at the Supreme Court –controlled by his supporters- the document authorizing it is ready,  If to the contrary, Chávez and his advisers perceive they have managed to modify the adverse scenario, they are willing to maintain the date.

Chávez trusts the generous State funds financing his campaign.  To form the comando, he appointed the ministers who manage it.  The use of fiscal resources in the electoral campaign is nothing new, but this time it has a new dimension:  the lack of controls.  Also new, -but much more serious- is the direct transfer of oil revenues for the funding of projects and missions which vertebrate the President’s electoral discourse.  With his insistence on the request of one billion dollars from international reserves, he got Central Bank to agree to contribute to the funding of an agro program.  The Bank impose requirements which displeased Chávez.   PDVSA –state oil industry- is legally bound to sell to Central Bank the hard currency it obtains for its exports.  In mid-May, 750 million dollars were diverted directly from PDVSA to the Development Bank..  This State Bank converts them into soft credits which the President gives out in events broadcast by the traditional radio and TV “network”.  Likewise, PDVSA has diverted tow billion dollars into a newly created Social Development Special Fund, for programs of obvious electoral dye:  Mercal:  establishments where foodstuffs and medicine are sold at generously subsidized prices; Barrio Adentro:  20,000 Cuban physicians who work and supply medications in poor neighborhoods; Misión Ribas:  scholarships for students kept out of higher education because of their poor academic performance while offering them admission into Bolivarian universities next year;  Plan Robinson:  the literacy program directed by Cuban teachers;  Misión Sucre:  the reservists who get stipends while in training.  And the last invention, Misión Vuelvan Caras (of an impressive simplicity):  a salary scholarship for every jobless who may actively join the revolutionary process.  In spite of all of this, the President is not satisfied with the electoral effects he perceives.   Bureaucratic incompetence and corruption plot against it.  A significant part of the resources take a turn into pockets or bank accounts of those who manage these programs.

WHY DISTRUST?

Chávez shows his smiling face in daily TV broadcasts, proclaiming that oil belongs to the people and that his plans and missions seek to redistribute oil revenues.  However, he does not appear to fully trust in his message power to convince.  Special ID and naturalization programs were created.  Those in charge would journey day and night through the national geography, with special emphasis on the border turf, making voters of all foreigners willing to support the President.

In Venezuela, there are between two and three million undocumented aliens who anxiously come to get citizenship status and ID.  Will they vote for Chávez?  The answer is far from simple.  The bulk of the undocumented are Colombians seeking refuge from guerrillas and for the common Colombian, guerrillas and Chávez are buddies. 

The opposition cries out for a cleanup and closing of the Electoral Registry.  Between the closing and 15 August, a period of several weeks is required to clean it up, to put it into the data base and to prepare the voting paperwork.  The opposition demands that the voting machines –acquired in a muggy negotiation- be subject to testing guaranteeing their trustworthiness.  It also demands  that norms be clearly defined, yet foggy, and that there be a commitment not to modify them –as it did happened- in the challenges process.  The are four specific electoral laws in place, with contradictory norms, applied by the NEC  in keeping with the interests of the process.  It also gave itself the power to change its own norms in whatever circumstances may “ensue.”  The opposition becomes alarmed with the announcement that those chosen at random, from those that signed asking for the RR, shall be removed from electoral tables.  The opposition warns about the perils of fraud, -represented by the jolly distribution of Ids, while insisting on the right of thousands of Venezuelans abroad to be enrolled in the Electoral Registry and to voice their opinion on 15 August.

One of the non-official NEC members –Dr. Ezequiel Zamora- has charged that there is a parallel body, exclusively formed by official members and that decisions are made only by this group.  The Democratic Coordinating Group maintains, without getting an answer, that a dialogue between players (government and opposition) is needed and that the NEC has the obligation to meet with them and to examine the numerous observations they have.

The fruit lacking in the cocktail was provided by the NEC President.  The regime passed a Supreme Court Act violating the Constitution and burying the Rule of Law according to Human Rights Watch, by which the total control of that Court is secured.  The Assembly fired a Justice –who for sometime had been showing flashes of independence- and is bent to destroy two others, from Electoral Hall, who dared to demand respect of their competence in electoral jurisdiction.  15 new magistrates will be appointed.  Dr. Carrasquero is running for a seat in the SC.  It is obvious that the NEC President will have to earn merits before the Chavista majority in the Assembly to be voted in.

OBSERVERS SHALL BE TRUE ARBITERS

In the international community there are no doubts about the need of international observation.  They fulfill the absence of a trustworthy arbiter.  Miguel Ángel Rodríguez, the new OAS Secretary General issued a statement in Madrid which has refreshed the milieu.  He affirmed that The OAS “shall offer assurances to the parts so that the process may be carried out legitimately.”  The Group of Friendly Nations has played a significant role by persuading Chávez that he ought to authorize the presence of observers.  The opinion of Brasil and Spain is important for Chávez.

At this juncture, there is the impression that Chávez cannot keep out international observers.  His purpose now is to delay invitations.  He would wish observers only at voting places.  Observers wish and ought to come ahead of time.  Their perception of the legitimacy of the RR requires the evaluation of conditions in which Venezuelans shall express their will.

The RR will represent crucial days for this country.  The external factor may be decisive to stop the ghost of violence and the feared bloodbath which could be the end of this dramatic chapter in The Venezuelan Case.