July 15th., 2004

Chávez fears losing the RR

Abstract:

• “I’ll win, but if I lose I’ll go and I’ll run again,” said Chávez to El Clarín  in Buenos Aires.

• The Comandante does not manage to recuperate from the challenges defeat.

• His campaign is beyond measure.

• In two weeks, he used the “network” for 15 hours to exult his mandate; discredit the opposition and ask for a vote of confidence.

• The President of the SC volunteers to please Chávez.

• Chávez wants to be his own substitute.

• The war of polls.

• Some say YES will win; others say NO will come out on top.

• The bellicose Comandante aims at conveying a new image.  He presents himself as the apostle of reconciliation, tolerance and dialogue.

• He shoots to conquer his harshest enemy of 5 years:  the influential middle class –much of it- now impoverished.

• He took off his robe of revolutionary caudillo.

• He pretends his past to be forgotten and for the present to be lived.

• A flagrant contradiction between the new strategy and the facts.

• Facts:  threats; layoffs; blackmail; political prisoners without being process before their natural judges; terrorist practices; firing of judges; violent armed bands.

• In 1990, polls projected Daniel Ortega as a winner.  Violeta Chamorro came out on top by a large margin.

• The regime becomes flexible in its rejection of observers.

• Successful moves by friendly countries and the European Union.

• The auditing of voting machines.

• The dangerous matter of fingerprint-hunters.

• A rumor campaign to make believe that these can reveal the vote.

• The DCG offered a program of government for the transition.

• 15 August shall measure the capacity of Venezuelans to open spaces for living together.

The question of the NEC to be answered by Venezuelans on 15 August challenges the impartiality of that public office:  “Do you agree to void the popular mandate –by legitimate democratic elections- of  citizen Hugo Rafael Chávez Frías as president of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela for the present presidential term?”  In spite of such friendly arbiter, Chávez has not denied he may lose the RR and he has just confirmed it in Buenos Aires.  “I shall win, but if I lose I’ll go and I’ll run again,” he said to the daily Clarín.  The statement appeared in Venezuelan media.  Opposition leaders stated that to be a candidate –in that case-, besides being a most serious constitutional fraud, would also be an acknowledgement that he has lost the recall and he’s attempting to raise the morale of his followers and to instill a sense of loss among his adversaries, while pretending his rebirth 30 days later –as the Phoenix Bird- to run for the Presidency.

Indeed, Chávez fails to recuperate from the tough defeat he suffered in the challenges process.  It shows in the lack of measured pace of his campaign.  On 5 July, Venezuela’s National Day, he turned the traditional military parade into an act of propaganda.  The broadcast of Europe 2004 –soccer competition passionately followed by millions of Venezuelans- in the past couple of weeks, was cut short for 15 hours, to praise his Administration; to discredit the opposition and to ask for a vote of confidence to stay in power.  The opposition is granted three daily minutes for its paid spots, under threats of heavy fines or suspensions on radio and TV stations, if otherwise allowed.  Chavista activists smear with their slogans front walls of houses and buildings while they harass tenants who protest; posters and signs all over available spaces in streets.  It is a an overbearing campaign; there is a perception–likewise-of a generalized counter reaction.

The announcement that he’ll run again –if he loses the recall- was immediately echoed by the SC President.  He unduly declared that the document is ready, authorizing the Comandante to be a candidate.  Accredited jurists and academia shared their views:  Art. 233 in the Constitution states the revoking of the mandate as an absolute fault.  When said fault comes into being, during the initial four years of the constitutional term, a new election shall be called –within the following consecutive thirty days-.  “While the new President is elected and takes his oath of office, the Vicepresident shall be in charge.  The new President shall complete the constitutional term.”    

STRATEGY VS. FACTS

In the Clarín interview he said:  “we have captured the findings of consultants working for entrepreneurs and we are ahead.”   He, no doubt, was referring to Greerberg, Quinlan, Rosner, Research Inc. hired by media entrepreneurs.  In its June study, it says that the intention of the NO vote has been improving, as an impact of the “missions”, to the point of overcoming the YES vote 49 / 44.  The study shows that the YES is well ahead in Sectors A, B, C and D; the NO is ahead 59 / 38 in E.  The survey –equally to that of Datos, shows other favorable results for Chávez and the government has profusely made it known, especially, abroad.

DCG sources acknowledge the prestige of the company, but they allege that figures on Sector E are not reliable because in poverty neighborhoods, abstention is always over 50 %:  people there are under permanent harassment from Chavista armed bands and whomever dares to side with the opposition can be a target of any sort of violence.

Datanálisis, in its June Report gives YES 57 % and NO 43 % while it warns that Chávez has been improving the level of response towards his mandate.  It concludes that the opposition has greater possibilities of winning the recall.  Keller & Associates say that the advantage of YES is only 2 points over NO.  Mercanálisis, in a sample taken in the five largest urban conglomerates countrywide, shows YES 54 % and NO 35 %; Consultores 21, shows YES 54 % and NO 41 %.  Polls are being tested tough.   If trends would favor Chávez, the NEC would be acting more swiftly.  It is still in doubt whether that body may be able to carry out the 15 August RR.

There is a flagrant contradiction between Chávez’s new electoral strategy and facts.  The Comandante appears as an apostle of reconciliation, tolerance and dialogue.  He’s advancing a crusade with the middle class, with sectors which have been adverse to him, while insisting that the economy has recovered; that the past should be forgotten; that there should be no more confrontations nor divisions among Venezuelans; that all their political or ideological differences be reunified to consolidate achievements.  He offers soft credits, tax elimination or reduction, activation of exports subsidies, and everything to make entrepreneurs smile.  He dropped the robe of revolution caudillo to show himself as a tidy Oxford professor, dressed by Saville Row top taylor.  NO commercials show handsome young men, with looks of successful executives and pretty young girls who are perhaps professional models.  It is obvious the pointed idea of the campaign is to place the electorate in a pleasant scenario today, under a shower of petrodollars.

The facts are threats of layoffs for public servants; revoking of contracts; stripping of nationality for those naturalized citizens; loss of subsidies, assistance; scholarships; credits; housing (etc.); for beneficiaries of “missions”; besides terrorist actions in urban belts inhabited by the poorest.  The number of political prisoners grows; they are denied the right to appear in civil courts; due process does not apply to them; they are charged with violations which carry a sentence up to 30 years in prison; a new Penal Code is reiterated to drastically sanction dissidence.  SC justices showing traits of independence are fired or retired.  The process goes on to secure a total predominance in that Court by incorporating new Chavista activists as Magistrates.  Armed bands relentlessly attack opposition groups. Reality grows of an -authoritarian, militarized, aggressive vs. the citizenry, not subject to the judicial order, power with a circumstantial discourse towards the electoral challenge while set on the autocratic project indefinitely.  

A foreign observer in a diplomatic reception pointed to his experience in the 1990 Nicaraguan elections.  The majority of the pollsters –Greenberg included- projected Daniel Ortega to be the winner by a large margin.  However, Violeta Chamorro won convincingly.

Empirical analysis of key figures is more indicative than those offered by the polls.  The opposition has an electoral base:  3, 500,000 who signed requesting the RR.  In July 2000, Chávez got 3,750,000 votes.  The REP (the country’s electoral registry) has not been updated, but estimates propose it adds to 13 million voters.  Abstention will be between 35 and 40 %.  The opposition’s electoral base is a hard one.  It seems logical to expect their numbers to increase, because now there are 6,000 more voting sites than those in the gathering of signatures and the vote is secret.  Chávez’s 2,750,000 votes have decreased  due to numerous desertions (governors; mayors; national and regional parliamentarians; local leaders) but it is undeniable that “missions” give him votes.  How many?  Not enough to recuperate the total of those he got in 2000.  In short,  the million plus new voters shall decide.  If they insert themselves in the polarized milieu of politics in Venezuela, the opposition will be above the 50 % of the probable vote on 15 August.

PRESSURE FROM THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY

External factors continue to be decisive.  The regime has had to be flexible in its rejection of international observation.  In Caracas diplomatic circles, there is talk of successful moves by the Group of Friendly Nations and the European Union.  Two of NEC officialdom members were in Washington in an attempt to improve this body’s image.  Notwithstanding, they were apparently impressed by what they heard.  From the U. S. capital they announced that the OAS and the Carter Center would be present in all the stages of the process.

Carter’s people, led by Jennifer McCoy traveled to Caracas right after the announcement.  They’ve been most active.  They formally received the invitation to participate as observers.  McCoy has said that the Center demands to observe preparations and campaigns and Carter will arrive with all members of his mission on 11 August.

The regime wants to show signs of flexibility regarding the auditing of electoral machines.  Jorge Rodríguez, -(President of the NEC)- said that before the RR, between 100 and 200 machines would randomly checked.  The opposition demands a more reliable auditing.  Another dangerous matter remains pending:  machines for hunting fingerprints.  Officialdom has launched rumors to make believe that their task is to verify the electorate vote.  The campaign is public, at barracks, governmental offices, missions recipients and foreigners massively naturalized in past months.  It is speculated that the function of said machines is to paralyze the voting process after mid-day, should exit polls show a strong YES triumph.  Machines, if utilized, would clog the system after several million have voted.

The DCG offered a program of government for the transition (A Country Consensus Plan).  It is a good response to Chávez’s strategy.  It des not turn its back to the national claim for peaceful and shared changes.  It proposes the great national task is to stop the confrontation and destruction process towards reconciliation and rebuilding.  Such abstract concepts will have to be translated into a simple and convincing message.  Voters expect answers for their basic needs:  shortages; unemployment and lack of security.

August 15, -if indeed there is an RR- does not mean a contest between Chávez and the opposition.  What will be truly measured is the capacity of Venezuelans to open spaces for living together and restoring democratic institutions.