November 1st., 2004

Regional Elections

Abstract:

• Diosdado Cabello -The Revolution’s No. 2 Man- was the emblematic figure of regional elections.
• The struggle for the State of Miranda.
• Chavez projected the defeat of Enrique Mendoza as the kiss of death vs. the opposition.
• Abstention was a determining factor in the outcome and it was promoted 
• both by the Government and the National Electoral Council (NEC).
• The opposition played a role in the results.
• Elections were scheduled in violation of the legal timetable.
• Electoral authorities did not heed charges of irregularities in The Electoral Registry and refused the public scrutiny of ballots.
• Officialdom controlled all electoral bodies.
• The opposition was unable to offer unified candidacies.
• Cabello’s candidacy as Chavez’s challenge and commitment.
• No. 2 believed he was safely in Chavez’s air carrier.
• Flesh and Bone Diosdado (God Given Diosdado).
• The problems of the Cabello Family.
• Abstention is a big blow for Chavez, especially, if No. 2 does not win clearly.
• The question of governance.  Its rescue goes through the reestablishment of peaceful living together.
• Chavez may choose between peaceful living together or confrontation.
• Governance, corruption and inefficiency are part and parcel of the pending agenda.

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The news:  a landslide Chavez victory. This matches the 1st Bulletin issued by the NEC.  There is no doubt that officialdom conquered the Major of Caracas and two important opposition-held governorships (Monagas and Bolivar). The opposition only managed to take away Nueva Esparta –a small tourist-Caribbean State-. Still in dispute, Miranda, Carabobo, Yaracuy and Anzoategui.

Beyond advanced initial analyses, the Venezuelan Event adds questions about Chavez and The Bolivarian Revolution.  In Venezuela Today, we are going to attempt a presentation from a perspective which may help its understanding:  the role of Lt. Diosdado Cabello.  He is the emblematic figure of the campaign.  He was selected by Chavez to run for the Governorship of Miranda. 

During the campaign he was presented as his child, thus affirming he’s the most trustworthy.  Chavez entrusted him with the greatest challenge of the Revolution: to defeat Enrique Mendoza –the strongman of the opposition- as Governor.  Mendoza led the DCG, playing a protagonist role in the Civic Movement which strongly advocated the RR attempt.  Miranda is a State of enormous importance.  Half of Caracas and its bedroom communities are within its territory.  In the East, under the jurisdiction of the State of Miranda, dwells the sizable and battle-hardened middleclass who became the vanguard of the opposition.  Miranda nourished the largest human contingents in the legendary street demonstrations vs. the Commandant.  Police people from Miranda and its municipalities –under opposition leadership- safeguarded the peaceful development of demonstrations.

In August 2000, Mendoza was reelected Governor of Miranda with over 60% of the vote, a larger percentage than that of Chavez on the same date.  Defeating Mendoza was a project conceived and personally directed by Chavez as a lethal blow vs. the opposition.  He entrusted Lt. Cabello with this task.  Cabello stated that it was a difficult challenge, “but abstention is going to help me.”  Indeed, abstention helped Chavista candidates.  It was a decisive factor in Sunday’s results.  It is not a new phenomenon:  but this time its stimulus was the strategy of the Government and –especially- that of the NEC.  The opposition helped with its contradictions and incoherencies.

THE MISTAKES OF THE OPPOSITION

Since the frustrated RR, opponents concentrated efforts in charging fraud.  This discourse pleased YES voters, whose majority were convinced their vote had been mocked.  Thus, it was senseless to be part of another fraud.  Until the end of September, the option to participate or to call for abstention was debated.  The latter gained strength when the NEC ratified the scheduling of elections in violation of a legal timetable as proposed by The Voting Act which dictated the closing of The Electoral Registry 90 days before elections and this should be announced 60 days before citizens go to the polls.  Abstention gained ethical meaning for its advocates.

It was incoherent to request glasnost guarantees while simultaneously stating the will to participate at any cost, in order to “defend power spaces.”  The NEC estimated it could bypass charges of Electoral Registry irregularities.  Public scrutiny of ballots –of marked votes in machines- was denied.  Officialdom kept control of precincts and their electoral tables.  Opposition spokespeople –in an attempt to reverse abstentions- stated eight days before elections that adequate conditions existed to vote.  At the same time, candidates with a national audience resigned while alleging they would not be part of a new fraud and the media harbored the abstention thesis as a tool for Chavez’s delegitimization.   The other powerful element in abstention was the inability of opponents to offer candidacies who had strong group support, especially, in States and Municipalities identified by the NEC to have had high levels of YES vote for the recall of the presidential mandate.  With known preliminary results, a unified, motivated opposition would have won ten or eleven Governorships.  This appreciation shall be clear in final results given by the NEC.  It will be an essential element in the analysis and development of an electoral policy of the Government and the Opposition.  By the initial statements of the DCG it seems that its priority is a new NEC.  Can it be attained?

Cabello’s running in Miranda was a challenge and Chavez took it upon himself.  It is undeniable That Chavismo constitutes a powerful political force countrywide.  The bulk of Caracas middleclass lives in Miranda, while the most populous poverty belt surrounding Caracas inhabits its neighboring hilltops.  Within this numerous target population – in the periphery of cities nationwide- surviving in dire conditions, the message of solidarity with the poor has had deep impact. 

The strength of the message is in the “missions,” nourished by abundant petrodollars and the emotional identification with the charismatic messenger.  Chavez, in the company of Cabello, personally delivered housing, credits, scholarships and land.  He received notes asking for assistance; he listened and offered to heed petitions while insisting that problems would be resolved upon the assumption of power by the new Governor:  who would offer everyone whatever financial resources are required.  For the Revolution’s No. 2, there was no problem in traveling first class in the air carrier of the Boss.

THE CANDIDACY OF THE CROWNED PRINCE

Newsman Juan Carlos Zapata managed to get an interview entitled “Diosdado Cabello in Flesh and Bone.” With impressive candor, Cabello and his wife admitted they could no longer live in Cumbres de Curumo (a middleclass neighborhood) because of the hostility of neighbors.  “For the kids, the problem has been very tough.  They have gone through four schools and were always scorned by classmates.”  Ms. Cabello laments the family cannot go to movies, even if kids ask to go.  She explained Diosdado’s solution to be together as a family –other than home- without any bother:  to go in the car, with Diosdado at the wheel, and ride into nearby areas with dark and closed windows.  Children have internalized the conflict.  The daughter identifies herself as Daniela Contreras (mother’s maiden name).  The son, named after his father, in school is known as Tito.

The Revolution has gained an electoral victory which consolidates power control.  But abstention is a big blow for Chavez.  Ten weeks ago, six million supporters went to the polls (according to NEC numbers backed by The OAS and The Carter Center).  He journeyed the country from town to town with the slogan:  “whomever does not back my candidates is not with me.”  In spite of this and beyond the “missions” and their obvious advantage, only some three million partisan followers answered the call.  A figure not much higher than that of the opposition.  Indeed, Sunday’s elections are a new ingredient in the study of the Chavez Phenomenon.  More so, if No. 2 does not manage to convince people that he is Governor on the strength of a plurality of votes.

For Diosdado the final tally of votes in Miranda is pending.  For his family, the right of his children to be called by their own names (Daniela and Diosdado) remains pending.  The Lt. warned that his problem is to win the middleclass over.  Indeed, but in more precise terms, his problem would be the same as that of the regime:  governance.  The rescue of governance goes through the reestablishment of the will of Venezuelans to peacefully living together.  Chavez has barely a few days to show if he wants life together or if he insists in confrontation.

In his Aló President after the RR, Chavez said that the Revolution faced three big problems:  governance; corruption and administrative inefficiency.  “The problem of governance –he said- is resolved by winning over governorships and mayoralties from the opposition.”  We believe he is wrong as governance has now become more difficult and complex.  Besides, corruption has made itself a State raison d’etre and the inefficiency of bureaucracy is pathetic.  If this perception is correct, the Bolivarian Revolution just completed the consolidation of huge power quotas, while governance; corruption; and administrative inefficiency of public matters remain in the pending agenda.