January 17th., 2005

 A History of Troubled Love

Summary:

• A Chávez-Uribe meeting in Cartagena.  Significant energy integration accords.  Within five days, Rodrigo Granda was apprehended.

• Fidel Castro stepped in –in November 2000- to mediate in the most dangerous crisis in Chávez-Colombia relationships.

• Then, Ambassador Julio Londońo was the messenger.

• Chávez-Uribe relations had been cool but cordial.

• The Granda Case sets the situation back into the history of troubled love.

• Bogotá threatens with evidence on the Venezuelan Government protection of the FARC “Chancellor”.

• Out in the open the issuance of Venezuelan identity to thousands of guerrillas.

• December was a productive month for the strategic map of the revolution.

• Dividends in the war vs. latifundia.

• Beginning effects of The Muzzle Act:  self-censorship and self-lashing.

• The Voice of The Catholic Church:  regression in human rights; legal barriers on freedom of expression; concentration of powers opening doors to a legal dictatorship.

• The Granda Case gets national and international attention.

• The coarse dialogue between Chávez and Bogotá creates uneasiness.

• Will Fidel mediate as in 2000?

At the 12 November meeting in which the New Phase of the Revolution was shaped, Chávez pointed to improved relationships with Colombia as one strategic objective.  In witnessing it, he informed on the friendly meeting with Uribe three days before, with significant bi-national energy accords.  The Chávez-Colombia relationship has been a history of troubled love in the words of former Colombian Chancellor Guillermo Fernández de Soto.  Generally, history is nourished by the unexpected.  Five weeks later of the Cartagena meeting, Rodrigo Granda –a guerrilla leader- was apprehended.

When Chávez took office in 1999, no one ignored what the relationship with Colombia would be.  With words and deeds, the Comandante had always proclaimed his identification with guerrillas.  Upon coming to power, in his first press conference (7 February, 1999) he said:  “we are neutral in terms of the domestic conflict in our neighboring country.”   A week later, he repeated it  in his visit to the border region:  “we won’t take sides”  (15 February, 1999).  On the eve of his first meeting with Pastrana he proclaimed that Casa Narińo’s  attempts to dialogue with guerrillas was an acknowledgement of their belligerence (10 October, 1999).  In reply, Pastrana cancelled the meeting.  The Colombian Ambassador’s residence in Caracas was shot at and explosives were thrown at the Consulate (27 October, 1999).  Tension increased with Chávez’s protagonic role vs. Plan Colombia together with his notorious permissiveness about guerrilla activities from within Venezuelan territory.  In November 2000, we wee on the brink of a breakup of relations due to the invitation issued to Colombian guerrillas to attend events of officialdom, within the background new border incidents and significant acts of support to guerrillas by Chávez.  The Ballestas Case became part of the scenario – and ELN Command chief who kidnapped an Avianca airplane-.  Ballestas took refuge in Venezuela with the protection of authorities.  President Fox failed in his efforts to mediate.

It was Fidel Castro who acted as fireman.  He Called Chávez to La Habana to voice concerns about the hiking in the worsening of relations.  After the meeting, Castro called Julio Londońo –Colombian Ambassador in Cuba- to tell him Chávez was seeking a meeting with Pastrana to convey his decision of improving “the framework of relationships.” He advanced “his impression” that the Government of Venezuela would extradite Ballestas.  He asked Londońo to travel to Caracas to speak to Chávez.  After Fidel’s mediation, a honeymoon between Chávez and Pastrana came into being.

The new “framework of relationships” survived microphone diplomacy, new border incidents, on-going Chávez support of guerrillas and passed its litmus test in 2002.  Colombia granted asylum to Pedro Carmona and Chávez granted it under Castro’s advise.

The honeymoon with Uribe continues.  The first meeting took place in Santa Marta (13 September, 2002).  When asked by reporters about differences, Chávez retorted:  “President Uribe and I are brethren forever together.”  El Tiempo in Bogotá rushed to echo the rumor that the legendary Tiro Fijo was in a Venezuelan hospital under medical treatment; that Venezuela was a respite zone for guerrillas.  But in an editorial note it recommended “to live with the uncomfortable neighbor.”  Until now, what Fidel labeled “framework of relationships” sharp highs and deep lows.

The Granda Case resumes the relationship back into the history of troubled love.  Fidel Castro may be worried.  The Cuban Caudillo does not hide his conviction that armed struggle in Colombia has run out of fuel.  He’s the one who may persuade Chávez that common interests impose to privilege tie with Uribe:  with a dignified exit for Caracas and Bogotá while accepting Chávez’s need to distract attention from adverse circumstances, namely, a) evidence which Bogotá could offer on Venezuela’s cover-up of  the FARC Chancellor and other guerrilla leaders; b) evidence in the Granda Case that Misión Identidad-(Mission Identity) –by which two million voters were added to The Electoral Registry for the RR- was indeed an open door for thousands of Colombian guerrillas getting Venezuelan ID Cards; c) the high-decibel noise needed by Chávez to create a curtain to cover the inefficiency and corruption of the police-military system Venezuelans see as the backbone of the revolution.

NO VACATION RECESS FOR THE REVOLUTION

At the 12 November get-together, the Lt. Col. demanded swift execution of revolutionary tasks.  “For us, December is not a vacation month, it is a month for revolutionary struggle.”  His parliamentarians abided faithfully.  The New Supreme Court was named to secure absolute control of the judiciary.  The Muzzle Act was passed to confront “the media conspiracy.”  In the initial New Year’s session a Penal Code Reform was passed including principles of belligerence right; criminalizing dissidence –even in its most innocent forms- and re-creation of old opinion misdeeds with severe penalties.  The President also activated an accord with Cuba regarding Assistance on Penal Issues.  Starting last 22 December, (published in Official Gazette) Cuba and Venezuela would assist each other in prevention, investigation and indictment of delinquency and in procedures regarding penal issues.

The war vs. latifundia is yielding excellent results for the revolution –more so abroad than at home-.  This problem was erase in Venezuela by the Agrarian Reform Act in the decade of the 60s

According to the last Census, in Venezuela there are 510,000 animal husbandry production units and barely 4,945 of these are larger than a thousand hectares.  Rural ownership is, generally, small and midsize.  However, the war vs. latifundia is perceived by the “Caviar-Left,” headed by Le Monde Diplomatique, as similar to Emiliano Zapata’s struggle in Mexico and Brazil’s Landless ask Lula to have Chávez’s guts to confront – latifundistas- big landowners. 

The Muzzle Act also produces dividends for the revolution.  Besides the obvious self-censorship in private radio and TV stations, the media has already started to broadcast 60 minutes daily of messages from official sources.  Initial messages have dealt with the bounties of The Muzzle Act.

WILL FIDEL CASTRO MEDDLE?

2005 threatened to begin with a new Chávez-Catholic Church clash.  It is the institution maintaining greater respectability in the Venezuelan crisis, while it has managed to keep, through six years, its commitment to the promotion of Christian civic values.  At the Ordinary Assembly of the Venezuelan Bishops Conference (CEV), the Nuncio Msgr. André Dupuy spoke.  Msgr. Baltazar Porras (CEV President) also spoke and a document was written:  dialogue and reconciliation were obligatory themes.  What the Church asks –says the Nuncio- as a player in the process, is its right to speak the truth, even if that truth may contradict that of the State.  Porras welcomed dialogue while showing concern by deed in national life contradicting its purpose.  His concerns are expressed in the CEV Final Document:  The Penal Code Reform is a step back  in terms of human rights and an intimidation tool vs. dissidence; restrictions of freedom of expression –even if by legislation- impairs knowledge of the truth, which is not a monopoly of any group.  The revolution has always been very sensitive to Church pronouncements.  This time, its most qualified spokespeople (Chávez and Rangel) replied with the fury of old .  They were exasperated about the charge that public powers concentration was opening doors to “a dictatorship clothed in legality” as well as the request of a pardon for political prisoners.

As usual, in the six years of revolutionary government there are always new and noisy scandals diluting those before.  This time, worsening conflict with Colombia took center stage.  Rough dialogue between Chávez and Casa Narińo begins to be worrisome.  We began this Report by stating that past fire threats in border (Colombia-Venezuela) plains, were put-off on time by Fidel Castro:  will he meddled anew?  For both the Cuban and Venezuelan Revolutions –now partners-, “the framework of relationships” Venezuela-Colombia is important.