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February 16th., 2005

Chavez’s Response to New Catastrophes


Summary:

  • Six years after the tragedy that destroyed the coastal strip near Caracas, it is clear that little had been done in the recovery of the devastated area.

  • Voices had been raised on this problem and the risks of a new catastrophe.

  •  It happened affecting most of the country and the proposed solution is the naming of a commission and the offer to order anew the national territory.

  • In the meeting with Lula, Chávez got a timely political lift in exchange for excellent business with Brazil.

  • In the meeting Uribe-Chávez, the page of The Granda Case was turned.

  • An Itamaraty Message to Fidel Castro for his “wisdom” in managing the Venezuela-Colombia conflict.

  • The Inter American Dialogue proposes to bring back Castro as an important player in hemispheric politics.

  • The advantages of harshly confronting Washington.

  • The Castro-Chávez Alliance and oil prices consolidate The Bolivarian Revolution and refuel the regional leadership of the Cuban Caudillo.

  • Venezuela rapidly moves into a political system inspired in the one Castro has established on the Island.

  • Venezuelan Democrats rethink the opposition.

  • Clean elections or peaceful resistance are the options.  What is expected from the international community.


The attention and concern of Venezuelans are focused on torrential rains and foreign issues.  In December 1999, the coastal strip closest to Caracas (State of Vargas), was left mostly buried by a giant mudslide with a tragic balance in loss of life and material damages.  This time the catastrophe started in Vargas and affected a large chunk of the country.  The exact number of casualties is yet unknown, but the volume of victims is large and the destruction of dwellings, streets, roads, harvests and cattle is heavy.

Public opinion reacted negatively:  six years later, it is clear that little had been done in the recovery of the devastation.  Then, the most qualified urban developers of the country were called upon to be part of a multidisciplinary commission.  Support from university and U. S., Japanese and European experts was sought [among these, some who planned the rebuilding of war-devastated cities.  A sole authority was named to direct the project echoing recommendations from foreign experts.  Generous national financial resources –above a billion dollars- were allocated.  Generous international aid was announced.  A famous professional in charge of the project was replaced by an army general due to internal problems within the regime.  For the past two years, voices were raised echoing concerns on the lack of execution of the plan and the risks of a new catastrophe.  When it came, Vargas was in a similar situation as that of December, 1999.  Now, in almost all of the country, people live the same tragedy and the announcement of the making of a Climate Risk Commission together with the old offer of ordering anew the territory, remains non-satisfactory to the people.

Problems of opinion have grown worse by the announcement that Venezuela will purchase air military equipment from Brasil.  Opposition parliamentarians have said this is no time to increase military expenditures, already ballooned by purchases of weaponry from Russia.  It is not a matter –they say- of debating whether to buy these from Russia rather than from traditional providers (U. S. and France).  The priority is that public monies should go to deal with rain calamities.

THE “WISDOM” OF FIDEL CASTRO

Last Monday, at the meeting with Lula, Chávez got a political lift and Lula returned to Planalto with fresh evidence of success in his efforts to expand his country’s economy.  In 2004, Brazilian exports to Venezuela were over $1,300 billion.  Exports from Venezuela to Brazil were close to $300 billion.  For this year, commercial exchanges should run over 3 billion in similar terms to 2004.

The Brazilian President anticipated the resolution of The Granda Case.  He congratulated Chávez on the “wise” management of the diplomatic impasse with Colombia.  Hours after he left, President Uribe arrived:  it was a short visit with a happy ending.  The joint statement showed a complete resolution of differences.  Chávez says that Venezuela has turned the page:  it is not a sanctuary for either guerrillas or terrorists.  According to Uribe, the struggle vs. guerrillas ought to comply with the judicial order.  Commercial exchanges are restored and a bi-national dialogue shall begin again.  A new chapter in the troubled love of Colombia-Chávez relations starts anew. (Venezuela Today 01-17-05).

Lula’s congratulatory remarks to Chávez were, indeed, an Itamaraty Message to Fidel Castro, for his “wisdom” in managing The Granda Case.  Venezuela Today, always insisted that Fidel was the only one who could persuade Chávez and the one reporting the mechanism of dialogue and accords.  Michael Shifter (Inter American Dialogue V. P.), one of the most qualified U. S. analysts, says in The Washington Post, without Castro’s mediation, it would have not been possible to resolve the diplomatic impasse threatening to become a serious conflict between “two countries of enormous strategic importance for the U. S.”  Shifter –who bears weight in Washington- adds:   “in shaping the future of the U. S. and its hemispheric policy to deal with an evermore authoritarian and unpredictable Chávez, Cuba cannot be ignored.”  His excellent article concludes that The Granda Case sat the U. S. and Colombia in one bench, in the other, Chávez and Venezuelan oil:  only Cuba was in a position allowing her to become a mediating option.” 

A pondered analysis should be added on Fidel’s role as the Patriarch of the Region due to him being portrayed as An Aging Caudillo + Venezuelan Oil.  It is obvious that the international community has had to accept Chávez’s leading role.  The President, indeed, is an expert in manipulating opinion.

His international activity is always a show.  His foreign policy –conceived as the strategy of the revolution- is played as an element of distraction (smokescreen).  Each time he had to speak on the rains catastrophe, he added an aggression vs. the U. S. and its President,  “Bush is most guilty for refusing to sign The Kyoto Treaty.”  What he seeks and gets is that his statements are twisted and distract attention off a problem (rains) creating general anguish.  Polemics with Washington, his role in Porto Alegre, meetings with Lula and Uribe have taken over headlines beyond the cry of victims of the catastrophic rains.

RETHINKING THE OPPOSITION

Systematic confrontation with the U. S. bears him good political capital at home and abroad.  That confrontation secures leftist solidarity; sympathy from powers as Russia and China and European smiles wishing to say the same in an educated fashion.

The Granda Case draws a new design in the continental scenario.  The alliance with Castro and oil prices have consolidated Chávez’s regime.  For Fidel, it is an alliance that rekindles him to the point of having The Inter American Dialogue (IAD) –an influential Think Tank- proposing reconsidering Cuba as a constructive factor within the intricate continental reality.  At the start of Chávez’s tenure, the strange proposition to take us through Seas of Happiness –as in Cuba- made us uneasy.  Now we realize that, indeed,  Venezuela moves on swiftly towards a Cuba-like political system.

At this time, parties and civil society work in “rethinking the opposition.”  The notion that the political crisis was not resolved by the August referendum gains ground.  There are elections scheduled –municipal and parliamentarian- for this year and presidential for the next.  The OAS and The Carter Center validated last 15 August results while attesting to weaknesses regarding trustworthiness, transparency and impartiality.  Recommendations were formulated about how to restore trust in electoral processes, greater transparency and impartiality by the arbiter.  The OAS and Carter vehemently called for government-opposition negotiations so that The National Assembly might designate a National Electoral Council (NEC) in keeping with The Constitution.

The Assembly has refused to fulfill the constitutional mandate.  The New Supreme Court –a product of one of the greatest travesties vs. The Rule of Law, in a rushed fashion named a Provisional Council, whose five members are openly linked to political organizations.  The Granda Case validated charges about fraudulent participation of foreigners in the RR.  In the three months before the , The Electoral Registry added 2,000,000 new voters to its record.

The millions of Venezuelans who abided by the electoral path proposed by The OAS and the international community request and expect solidarity in claiming compliance with The Constitution and The Voting Act.  The message from Venezuelan Democrats does not seem to be out of place:  there will be no other alternative than peaceful resistance, should the electoral path remain unclear.

DEMOCRACIA Y DESARROLLO
Presidente: Pedro Pablo Aguilar
P.O. Box International 02-5225
Miami, FL 33102-522
Fax: (52-212)267-2420