March 31st., 2005

The Guayana Summit

Summary:

• Zapatero justified the arms sale to Chávez as a contribution to peoples integration.

• The Colombian Government is more concerned about where the discarded Venezuelan arms end up than about the new weapons purchase by Chávez.

• Lula pads Chávez on the back.

• The word “democracy” in The Declaration of Guyana City.

• Oil as the axis of a new geopolitical map.

• Uneasiness in the Hispanic-Venezuelan Community.

• In the meeting with the Spanish Community there was a boisterous protest when Chávez was mentioned.

• AD –with full membership in The Socialist International, together with PSOE- rejected meeting with Zapatero.

• Other opposition parties presented a dossier on the authoritarian tendencies of the regime.

• Zapatero acknowledges there is a democratic and institutional deficit in Venezuela.

• Lula’s support of Chávez echoes in Washington.

• Is there a coherent U. S. policy towards Latin America?

• Chávez has become a key regional player due to oil and its high prices –managed by him as a geostrategic tool-.

On March 29, Chávez, Brazil, Colombia and Spain signed The Guyana Declaration.  It repeats the usual in the summit carnival taking place in the most attractive tourist spots in Latin America.  The arms race issue while not in the agenda was, indeed, part of the exchange between those in the gathering –weapons importers and exporters-.  As in any commercial operation, buyers and sellers gave their reasons.  Zapatero, when asked about his controversial arms deal with Chávez, replied:   “it is Spanish policy… to work for peoples integration.”  With Uribe at his side he added:  “the criteria in the arms sale to Venezuela are the same for all countries, Colombia included.”

Uribe’s answer was incisive. If weapons Spain sells to Venezuela are to fight narcotraffic and terrorism, “that objective helps Colombia… what worries us is that new or old weapons continue to get into Colombian terrorists.”  A clear reference to the suspicion that part of the 100,000 assault rifles from Russia or the discarded FAL weaponry of the Venezuelan Army, would end-up in the hands of the narcoguerrilla.  Chávez, shrewdly, appeared not to have heard Uribe’s remarks.  This forced Carolina Barco to pinpoint –the next day- that the Colombian Government is more concerned about the destiny of discarded Venezuelan weaponry than for new arms purchased by Chávez in Russia and Spain.  Chávez’s main argument was not new:  all countries are updating their weaponry and we are sovereign.   This called for Lula’s pad on the back:  Venezuela has the right to be sovereign, to make its own decisions.

What is curious in the long text of the Declaration is the almost total absence of the word democracy.  “It is a primordial political postulate,” was the only and lonely reference.  Carlos Malamud, who follows with interest the process in Venezuela, from his watch tower at El Real Instituto Elcano, denied that there would be affinities between Rodríguez Zapatero and Chávez:  “The Spanish Government –he said- attempts to apply a Social Democratic Program which abides by the rules of the game, which does not impair political and civil liberties and is respectful of the separation of powers.  That does not happen in Venezuela.”  The reporter asked him:  “And if it is so anti-democratic, why it has become fashionable for rulers to visit that country?”  Malamud replied with another question:  “what is the price of oil?  54 Dollars? There is the answer.”

BACKGROUND OF A TOUR

At the press conference, reporters perceived a kind of  “anti-Gringo” flavor, even if Rodríguez Zapatero, Lula and Chávez insisted there is no climate of confrontation.  It is “a new geopolitical map,” which they are called into drawing.  No special sagacity is required to read oil as the axis of the new map.

Oil is the axis of formalized accords by the Presidents of Spain and Venezuela.  A joint venture between Oils of Venezuela (PDVSA) and REPSOL, which would allow the Spanish partner to increase 60% of its present production while duplicating the reserves level in Venezuelan oil fields.  Other agreements place REPSOL favorably in the struggle of oil giants for The Orinoco Strip and The Delta Platform 

The Spanish President went to Bogotá, reasonably persuaded that he has strengthened his links with the Venezuelan military caudillo.  The other side of the coin is the malaise it left in the Venezuelan Hispanic Community.  Spanish immigrants have not been too happy with the revolution.  A sizable number chose to return to their homeland with their families.  Those remaining have become part of opposition groups.  Immigrant children have lead the most combative tendencies.  Some are in jail, i. e., Gen. Francisco Usón, the most brilliant officer within his class –a child of one of the many Republican activists who came to Venezuela fleeing Franquismo.  He is in prison for several years for presumed slander of The Armed Forces.  Children of European immigrants –mostly Spaniards- were the technocrats in the oil industry for over 30 years after its nationalization.  They are part of the 16,000 technocrats and specialized workers fired by Chávez.  In Venezuela they cannot work, not even in REPSOL, because they signed the RR petition.  The Revolution believes the signees are enemies of the State.  Hence, they lost the right to work in the government or in public enterprises.  This prohibition involves private companies who have State contracts.  This explains the poor attendance to a meeting with the Hispanic Community and the jeering when Chávez was mentioned.

The impact left by the Spanish President on his political family was not good either, if The Internationals are a reflection.  Acción Democrática (AD) –a full member in he Socialist International- as PSOE also is, declined the invitation of The Spanish Embassy to gather with Rodríguez Zapatero.  ADECO leaders filtered an alleged interview with Ambassador Raúl Morodo, to remind him of the significant support of  ADECO  governments to PSOE in the 60s and 70s, while asking him to render his President a qualified report.

The other opposition parties, invited by Morodo, did attend while stating that they were delivering texts of several pieces of legislation (The Muzzle Act; The Penal Code Reform Act and The Supreme Court Act) as elements of evaluation of the truth about the regime.

Zapatero was impressed by the long list of political prisoners and of those charged for alleged crimes of conspiracy, homeland treason or disrespect of authorities.  Likewise, he said to disagree with attacks vs. Newspeople and measures curtailing freedom of expression.  He showed awareness that there is a democratic and institutional deficit in Venezuela.

Rodríguez Zapatero ended his interview with the opposition proposing that The Spanish Embassy be considered as “The House of Democracy,” –this was taken to be a scolding of Morodo- who during his tenure has kept The Embassy’s doors shut to those who dissent from the regime.

CHALLENGES FOR U. S. DIPLOMACY

The event at Guyana City was newsworthy for those covering Washington and The State Department.  They asked spokesperson Adam Ereli about Lula´s  pad-in-the-back to Chávez:  this inquiry is justified because on 03-23 Donald Rumsfeld was in Brasilia and he told Lula the critical perspective Washington has of the Chavista regime.  Likewise, the question is justified by recent statements by Bush and s. Rice –among other U. S. spokespeople- lacking coherence in the diplomatic strategy to contain Chávez.  This is why some analysts believe that the U. S. Government has no clear Latin American Policy.  Radicals –on the other hand- go further:  it is not that the policy is unclear, but rather it is that there is a lack of policy. Within a more balanced stand, what is obvious is that there are novelties in Latin America, among others, the political impact of poverty; the growth of populism; the electoral triumphs of the Left; drug trafficking shadowing power struggles; terrorism; among so many others.  Chávez came on to the scenario, demanding the same protagonist role of Fidel last century and Lula poised to recoup Brazil’s regional leadership.

The U. S. has no choice but to look –with attention and respect- towards the South of the Continent.  The goals of any commonsense policy, conservative or liberal, Republican or Democrat are pinpointed by John Doe:  economic development with social equity and political stability.  What is the role of Chávez in achieving said goals?  In the reply there will be some of the major elements of U. S. Latin American Policy –with special attention to Venezuela- where oil and its high prices, managed by Chávez as geostrategic tools, have made him a key player in the region.

The XXI Century placed the U. S. face-to-face with the fact that instability South of the Río Grande is a national security problem and that, in the new historical time, the U. S. cannot repeat past errors in LATIN AMERICA.