August 1st., 2005

I Better Stay

Summary:

• Chávez announced he’ll stay as President until 2023.

• A year ago he said it would be until 2024.

• Petrodollars and the military shore up his will of retaining power indefinitely.

• On 7 August, he’ll proclaim another electoral victory but Venezuela lacks a legitimate body to certify results.

• Abstention shall hurt Chávez.

• The Lt. Col. is concerned about international recognition.

• For the December parliamentary elections he wants OAS and EU Missions as observers.

• Recipients of Mission handouts now request stable jobs, social security and housing.

• What benefits Venezuelans gain by the use of oil as a political tool?

• The regional integration discourse has too high a price.

• Chávez worries about faulty energy service in Cuba and creates an Aid Fund for Castro.

• The Cuban presence in Missions yields political dividends for Chávez but generates anger in important sectors.

• Chávez makes efforts to achieve military solidarity in his relationship with Castro.

• PDVSA admits the decline in oil production.

• Chávez has failed to control key players in Venezuelan life.

The Naval Academy is on a plateau facing The Caribbean, in the vicinity of Caracas.  In its main patio, on 24 July, Chávez was honored within festivities of Navy Day.  The Battle of Lago Maracaibo (24 July, 1823) ended the struggle for Venezuelan independence.  The smiling Lt. Col. gazing at generals and admirals around him, announced he’ll stay as President until 2023:  “I had projected to remain until 2021, but it’s better if I stay until 24 July, 2023, to close The Bicentennial   Cycle with this very same celebration.”  His presidential mandate is framed  in XIX Century Battles.  Why 2021?  It is The Carabobo Bicentennial, a key date in our War of Independence.  It is not the limit.  In December, 2004 he attended events commemorating The Battle of Ayacucho and announced he’ll preside the bicentennial of the battle which ended  the presence of Spanish troops in South America.

It would be 25 years in power, but the man he most admires has kept himself in power during 47 while confronting the Northern Giant.  Who but him can carry on in Latin America leading the struggle vs. imperialism?  On 28 Thursday he celebrated his 51^st birthday; the oil basket inching $50 and smiling generals and admirals in his entourage pleased when he said “I Better Stay.”  Petrodollars and the military shore up his will of retaining power indefinitely:  there is a constitutional reform project eliminating the item of No-Reelection.  On Sunday, 7 August he’ll be able to proclaim another electoral victory.  These are only municipal elections where candidates of officialdom run on a sole platform of loyalty to the Lt. Col.  Issued votes belong to the President, which means both good and bad news.  The good one is that he will thoroughly filled spaces in public power; the bad news is that results will not be certified by any proper body.  The National Electoral Council (NEC) is denied legitimacy as it was not elected nor made in keeping with The Constitution.  This controversial body –whose ruling is totally in the hands of radical Chavistas- will have problems in hiding abstention due to the predominant apathy and the lack of voters at precinct tables.  Abstention may hurt the President who echoes polls giving him 80% of popular support.  For his reelection next year he affirms he’ll get 10 million votes equaling 70% of registered voters.  Chávez wishes to stay in power but is obsessed with leading Socialism in the XXI Century.

OIL FOR BANANAS

He argues that it is the people’s will before objections vs. his representing a model of authoritarian militarism while he wants to maintain the recognition of the international community given to him by The OAS and The Carter Center a year ago.  His concern about international approval explains the invitation to Insulza to send OAS observers to parliamentary elections.  He also seeks EU presence subject to strict norms of transparency.  His immediate challenge is to obtain massive victories in December and in next year’s presidential elections.  This would allow him to eliminate from The Constitution the barrier of a new election and would make effective the “I Better Stay,”  with The OAS – EU blessing:  this is a challenge and a project.      

Alfredo Keller –an accredited pollster- maintains that backing of Chávez is declining while the level of malaise is growing.  He attributes this to the weakening of wellbeing generated by Missions.  Those recipients are now asking for stable jobs, social security and housing.  There is a gap between illusion (Chávez resolves problems 74%) and reality (perception of problems resolved 24%), as well as conflict between emotional and rational, even among his followers.

The Economist recently analyzed actions by Chávez in the creation of a Bloc vs. The U. S. through the use of oil.  It is difficult to see –it says- what benefits have Venezuelans gained from said policy.  Dailies –constrained by self-censorship imposed by The Muzzle Act- maintain discretion in dealing with the matter while always finding telling headlines or phrases.  They underscored statements by the Uruguayan Vice-President on his positive visit to Caracas.  The Venezuelan Government shall swiftly channel the supply of oil in exchange for meat and dairy products and will invest 1 billion dollars in a refinery in the Southern country.  Chávez will travel to Montevideo to round-up accords and to witness the arrival of the first million barrels.  He’ll also bring good news to Buenos Aires:  Venezuela will offer 112 million dollars so Argentineans may reactivate The Río Santiago Shipyards and the building of two oil tankers.  In terms of oil tankers, Brazil hopes to get the larger share (forty ships for 2 billion dollars).  Others  like Spain, China and Korea have also been offered business, but Brazilians are front runners.  According to a spokesperson in The Ministry of Transport, -Sergio Bacci- said that the preference for Brazil is a political decision by Chávez stemming from the priority he gives to regional integration and that Venezuelans offer to avoid traditional steps of international bidding required by law:  there is rush to complete agreements.

According to Chávez, PETROCARIBE is a solidarity strategy and payments can be made in domestic exchange products of Caribbean islands, such as sugar and bananas.  PETROANDINA, as he stated in Lima, will be able to guarantee quality energy at the lowest possible cost.  He offered 40,000 daily barrels (at cost) to Ecuador and to tke over 300 million of debt.  Ecuadorians, as well as Argentineans, hope to have sales of 500 million dollars.

WOULD THERE BE ENOUGH OIL?

Cuba is the priority.  In Venezuela Today (05-02-05)we analyzed the accord for the application of ALBA and the 43 agreements signed in La Habana last April aimed at bi-national integration.  Venezuelan aid carries the sign of opportunity.  An Autonomous International Cooperation Fund (AICF) has just been created with PDVSA resources, with 70 million dollars as seed money.  Its first operation was a remittance for the Island’s Energy Industry, where prolonged blackouts are again worrying Fidel, who in his 26-VII speech promised energy self-sufficiency:  one of its pillars would be the rehabilitation of the obsolete Cienfuegos Refinery by a PDVSA-CUPET Accord.  He also stated that bilateral trade with Venezuela shall reach 3 billion dollars this year.

The Mission Barrio Adentro renders political dividends to Chávez but it has provoked an angry reaction in physicians and health workers.  There is a similar reaction in universities for Cuban meddling in higher education.  School guilds resent the imposition of Cuban teachers in administrative positions.  Also, the on-going, generalized protest for the strong ideological contents in the cooperation accords.  Chávez makes efforts to achieve solidarity of the military towards his relationship with Fidel.  He sent The Army’s High Command Class –sponsored by Castro- to Cuba.  In  the barracks, pamphlets circulate of the military casualties of the sixties vs. guerrillas from Cuba.  There exists some uneasiness as Chávez dropped the plan to grant the honorary rank of Chief General to Castro.

Chávez hopes to stay in power.  He’s counting on the military, oil and missions to support him.  Oil is the leading player.  PDVSA –finally- that 2003 production was 2,700,000 daily barrels.  OPEC and The International Energy Agency (IAE) oil output has not changed.  Private companies –with 1,100,00 barrels-x-day have frozen investment due to fiscal harassment.  A PDVSA OCCIDENTE  has become known showing a drop of  258,000 barrel-x-day in output.  For this year The Ministry of Finance announces a Budget of 38 billion dollars excluding the large industrial plants and the costly infrastructure work offered.

Aspirations of continuity and continental leadership are bound to oil and oil is bound to missions and barrack loyalty.  Chávez’s inability to control some adversaries –intellectuals; universities; professional guilds; mass media; entrepreneurs; middleclass sectors; churches –especially The Catholic Church-, the most cherished national institution, and, above all, the open collective will to live in freedom, shared by Light Chavismo, in greater numbers today than Hard Chavismo.