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December 1st., 2007

The Night Before The Referendum


M

In the survey war that preceded the referendum, the reports or presentations of the most renowned enterprises fitted in with the fact that an important majority rejects the reform. Although the differences vary, some key meters don’t. They all show that the more the people know about the contents of the reform, the more they reject it. According to Datanalisis’ last report, “from October through November, the YES vote recoiled from 49.3% to 39.3%, falling about 10 points, while the NO vote raised from 34.4% in October to 48.8% in November, increasing by 14 points. The answers “does not know, does not answer” fell from 16.2% to 11.9%”. For Datanalisis, “this drastic change of the YES and NO tendencies is a surprise. However, it is not an isolated change.

 

It is linked to the other meters, which seem to correlate to each other.” It points out that the number of people who define themselves as supporters of the government decreased from 35% in October to 29% in November, and those who define themselves as detractors of the government raised from 18% to 24%, on one hand, and on the other, that the E strata (traditionally supporter of the government) has decreased from 62% to 31%.

 

In the tracking poll that was done in the Metropolitan District by the Venezuelan Institute of Data Analysis, late November, the NO reached 51.1% and the YES decreased to 26.7%. According to the Institute, the vote intention, which is polarized, could lead to a 60-40 outcome, in favor of the NO. The surveys of both enterprises forecasted Chavez’s, his candidates’ or his proposals’ victory in all the preceding electoral events. Other survey agencies forecasted that a few days prior to the referendum, the tendencies point out that the NO will win, and that Chavez harmed the personalization by identifying the YES vote as a vote of trust in him. According to Keller’s statistics charts, the NO is so strong that it reduced the YES supporters to die-hard Chavez supporters, currently 30%. It is interesting that during the survey war, the government side did not publish any surveys; they only repeated the president’s words: “we’ll thrash them.”

 

The students called for a manifestation in the Bolivar Avenue, the public space which is used as a political thermometer. The regime has stated for years that it is a territory for the exclusive use of the revolution. Only the President’s acts are allowed to take place there. The photos appeared in the covers of the independent journals of Venezuela and several others throughout the continent and Europe. By observing them, it is evident that there were hundreds of thousands of demonstrators. Commentators affirm that it is one of the largest people concentrations that have taken place there. The reasons for the government not to prohibit this manifestation could be the wrong presumption that it would be a great opportunity to show the weak support “Bush’s puppies” have, or the presence of hundreds of foreign journalists, to whom it is not convenient to show the authoritarian side. The students have also managed to involve the non chavista archipelago, which advocated abstention until not long ago. The leader of the university students, Jon Goicochea, called for going to vote “under protest”, because “the referee is not trusted, there is no equity in the competition, and what the government proposes is a constitutional fraud.”

 

THE INTERNATIONAL SCENE

 

The key in order to define the end of the struggle between Chavez and Uribe will be determined by the Venezuelan President’s mood and the results of the referendum, according to the Cambio de Bogotá magazine. In Caracas, analysts sustain that Chavez had reasons for a severe disturbance in his state of mind when he affirmed: “As long as Uribe is the President of Colombia, I will not hold any kind of relationship neither with him nor with the Colombian government.” The week before, he had two royal reprimands. In Saudi Arabia, Abdullah reproached him for trying to politicize the OPEC and in Chile, the King of Spain made him fall silent when he asked him “why don’t you shut up?” In Paris he did not bring the proof of life of Ingrid Betancourt that he had promised to bring. His insults to Aznar in the Ibero-American Summit led to his rupture with Zapatero and the freezing of the relations with Spain. In Chile, president Bachelet publicly expressed her displeasure with his inherence in the conflict with Bolivia, the impertinences during the Summit and the reject to her petition of transmitting the concern of the Latin Americans for the oil prices to the OPEC. It is comprehensible that these setbacks have influenced the furious tone of the president’s words, which is evident when he declared the freezing of the relations with Colombia.

 

Uribe replied with extremely serious statements. “President Chavez, it is unacceptable to burn down the continent just like you are doing it. We need mediation, not terrorism legalizes. Your words, your behavior, make it seem you are not interested in peace, but in calling forth the humanitarian agreement to intervene in Colombia by supporting the FARC.” Uribe also accused Chavez of wanting to get electoral benefit from the situation: “I find it very worrying that you, zealous with your electoral aspirations, are now trying to pull out the old trick of stimulating hatred in Venezuela against Colombia and the Colombian government, seeking support with a message that hurts so much both of our countries.” According to what Uribe said, Senator Piedad Cordoba acts as a link with the FARC in order to examine the possibility of a “transition government.” In the closing ceremony of his electoral campaign, Chavez revealed that Ingrid Betancourt’s and other hostages’ proofs of life, which he had requested to Marulanda, were intercepted by Uribe. The government’s peace commissioner, Luis Carlos Restrepo, stated that the letters, videos and photos that were found, date October 23rd and 24th. The French Ministry of Foreign Affairs considered that Chavez’s mediation for the liberation of hostages is a matter “of the past”. In the closing ceremony of his electoral campaign, Chavez said that Marulanda had sent him the proof of life and it was seized by Uribe’s intelligence services, risking the lives of the hostages.

 

Chavez’s speech, other than the traditional rhetoric against the US, was aggressive with Colombia and Spain. Experts say he seeks to agglutinate the support of his followers towards nationalist radicalism, because the reform has not generated enthusiasm amongst the “chavista” electorate. According to BBC World’s correspondent in Caracas, Chavez intensified his strategy of transforming the referendum into a plebiscite about himself. If the relations with Colombia depend on the president’s mood, Sunday’s consult –transformed into a plebiscite-, would be a hard blow against Chavez and could force him to moderate his bellicose foreign policy, especially with the neighbor that is currently exporting the vital food products in order to relieve the shortage, a serious problem that affects the entire population.

 

THE LOCAL SCENE

 

The National Election Council (CNE) prohibited the publishing of surveys, except for the President, who assured in the closing ceremony and in several television programs that the surveys that he consulted give the YES an advantage of 10 to 15 points. He claimed to be ready to prevent, at all costs, street demonstrations which pretend to disregard the results of the referendum. According to Hinterlaces’ last report, Chavez’s plebiscite strategy failed. He managed to unite his most loyal followers, but he could not obtain new support from his moderate voters. The last tracking shows results that even with a margin of error place the NO as victorious. 59% disagree with the reform. 80% claim they’re willing to vote, 58% would vote against and 37% for. 76% think they can sympathize with Chavez and vote against the reform. According to Hinterlaces “the worst outlook is a triumph of the NO with an advantage of 7% and the best one is a victory with an advantage of 16%.”  The electorate will participate massively, but the non chavista sectors have insisted in the point that the referendum is a constitutional fraud, and that they’re voting under protest, in reason of the bias towards the government, the improper use of the public resources, the vices of the Electoral Registry, the use of the fingerprint scanners as an intimidation mechanism against public workers and the lack of trust on the CNE, an institution in which four out of five of the main members publicly claim to be involved in the revolution. Independent union leaders expressed that in ten out of the eleven elections Chavez has won “he has recurred to the most abject expedient to be known, he has manipulated the people that need revenue, small as it can be, in order to sustain his or her family.” They add that over two million employees, workers, hired personnel and grant holders of the “misiones” are closely supervised in order to force them to vote for the regime’s proposal.

 

The leaders of the NO block study the possible outlooks after a victory of the NO: 1) Chavez would like to recognize it but the extremists in his own party do not allow him to; 2) Chavez loses control of his followers and they create street riots that make it impossible for the CNE to recognize the triumph of the NO; 3) The Army turns against the recognition of the victory of the NO; 4) Chavez refuses to admit he was beaten and his radical followers and the Army support this attitude. The leaders of the NO block assure they are ready to act in order to face any of these possible outcomes. During his Bolivar Avenue speech, Chavez condemned the presence of the international media and declared the expulsion of the correspondents who had come to take part in an imperialism operation.

 

Venezuela Today estimates that it is the international medias task to cover for the absence of the European Union and the OAS observers.

DEMOCRACIA Y DESARROLLO
Presidente: Pedro Pablo Aguilar
P.O. Box International 02-5225
Miami, FL 33102-522
Fax: (52-212)267-2420