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March 2nd.,
2009
The Occupation Of Private Companies
As the beginning of an interventionist escalade, Chavez,
in Hello President of March 1, manifested the
following: If the companies “deny to produce and pack
rice for the consumption of the Venezuelan meal, and
they have denied once and one hundred times, I am tired
of it! and I told Elias Jaua (Minister of Agriculture):
intervene them, and if they get funny (if they resist
themselves) we will expropriate them and we will pay
them with papers”. Once the order was received, without
any judicial proceeding, military and government
officials proceeded to occupy a rice processing center,
property of Alimentos Polar, in the city of Calabozo,
Guárico State, and another one by Alimentos Mary, in
Turén, Portuguesa State. What Chavez did not say was
that the government controls over 50% of the rice that
is consumed in the country, whilst Polar, a privileged
foodstuffs industry, does not control more than 6%.
As pointed out by the Madrid newspaper ABC, “None
of the expropriated, confiscated companies taken from
the private sector by the Chavez´ government has given
any productive results. His bad performance and
inefficiency is notorious. The workers, belated, have
realized that they are loosing their positions and their
liberty to choose in the private companies that have
become Socialist in a way mandatory, as stated by the
non government unions”. Meanwhile, representatives from
the opposition have qualified the occupation on the part
of the government of Hugo Chavez of the rice plants as
“arbitrary and disproportional”. But as if this was not
the least of things, they also proceeded to occupy the
private seaside resort Marina Grande, located less than
30 Km. from Caracas, with the pretext that they were
charging excessive rates for the use of the premises; as
well as of farms in the interior of the country.
After these takeovers, representatives of the Employers´
Association Fedecamaras, as well as professionals,
industrials, merchants, stockbreeders, farmers and
students have lighted the signs of alarm, before what
they qualify as acts of the regime, that deem to oblige
the farming industry to produce in spite of a loss, the
regulated rice, to later on bring out the stocked cereal
and deceive the population stating that with such
measure, the government achieved to re establish supply,
as declared by José Manuel Sanchez, President of the
Employers´ Association. On the part of the Students´
leader, Ricardo Sanchez, he showed his disagreement with
the intervention of the rice centers and announced that
they would initiate a series of actions.
Additionally, the Bank Provincial, whose major
shareholder is the Spanish Bank Bilbao Vizcaya (BBVA),
is currently threatened to be paralyzed by a strike, if
it denies to discuss a collective contract with the
Bolivarian Union that comprises 256 workers of such
institution. The representatives from the Bank request
to effect a referendum, alleging that the other Union,
that is not pro government, represents more than 3,000
of its workers.
OIL DOES WILL NOT SOLVE THE CRISIS
The President may be isolating from the people, because
he is not listening enough and he is not listening to
what is really important. ¨Hello President became
a class wherein he teaches history, geography, humanism,
etc. And his orders are lost in the holes of
bureaucracy.” This is not written a Chavez critic but by
one of his fanatics. Similar opinions often appear in
Aporrea, an open digital page for those who
support the President, and it expresses what the base of
those who follow Chavez feel, what it picks up in the
street. Column writers who are defined as spokespeople
for the middle independent class, called the Ni Ni´s,
coincide in that Chavez has a difficulty in assimilating
the effects in Venezuela of the magnitude of the world
crisis, which is such a grave error that it puts his
future at stake. The transfer of 12 Thousand Million
Dollars from the reserves to Fonden, and the future sale
of oil reveal that there is an important lack of cash
flow. Notwithstanding, the Finance Minister expressed
that they are evaluating to re calculate the prices of
oil and his confidence that such prices will soon rise.
¨Traditionally, economists’ lie¨. The experts coincide
in that the strategy before the crisis should not be
based on a hypothesis so adventurous as the oil prices.
The Central Bank informs that the recessive process of
the economy was made present in 2008 notwithstanding an
average price of oil at US$ 90 a barrel. The rescue of
a non oil productive economy seems indispensable, which
would mean a 180 degree turn in the government
policies. The hypothesis is inadmissible for Chavez,
who affirms ¨that there will not be dialogue with the
rotten tips of Capitalism¨. I have repeated that I am
willing to review and rectify, but it will be with
dialogue with the people, never with the oligarchy¨.
Dr. Palma, President of the National Academy of
Economic Sciences explained that with an average price
of the oil basket, and given the first months of 2009,
the income perceived by oil sales are less than half of
2008, if the levels of imports and exports reported by
Pdvsa are true, and that the whole thing would be a
catastrophe, if we take into account, or as true, the
exportation volume reported by OPEC and by the
International Energy Agency, which report that only 2,35
Million of barrels per day are produced. In this case,
he stated, the value of the exports would not cover even
50% of what we import, and he predicted that not
withstanding the government’s rhetoric, the importation
volume will be restricted and there will be severe
limitations in the amount of preferential Dollars for
productive companies.
Chavez’ surprising trip to Havana had the oil issue as
the main agenda. He celebrated two meetings with Fidel
and he met with Raul. The supply of 100,000 daily
barrels to Cuba aggravates Venezuela’s situation, but
Chavez has turned that relationship into a kind of
hindrance, not only an economic one, but an emotional
one.
To reduce the supply is only viable if Fidel himself so
advises. He has followed the reality of the Venezuelan
oil closely. We must suppose that the maximum interest
of the Castro brothers is to collaborate and prevent
Chavez’ shipwreck, their main supplier, even if Raul
Castro seems to want to separate a little from Chavez
and get closer to Lula.
THE PDVSA CRISIS
The oil industry is falling to pieces. This is the
headline news of a report published by a local
newspaper. This is not far fetched news, since the not
so long ago potent oil company now imports gasoline to
guarantee its availability in the domestic market.
PDVSA’s problems started with the letting go of 20,000
technicians, workers and employees that had achieved to
turn the company into one of the most qualified in the
world of hydrocarbons. They were substituted by those
loyal to the regime, without any other credential than
that of their political adhesion. PDVSA stopped being
specifically an oil company to turn into the financial
center for Chavez’ social programs, of this
international policy and of the electoral campaigns.
This deformation reached extremes in the February 15
referendum; so much that foreign journalists were
surprised to presence caravans of vehicles that ran
through the cities with the logo of the company,
decorated with huge pictures of Chavez. The crisis in
PDVSA is turning into the Achilles heel for the regime.
Their missions, such as Barrio Adentro, Vivienda
(housing) and Mercal are victims of the fiscal deficit.
The beneficiaries of the Missions have been the
political muscle for Chavez. They are out in the
street, in daily demonstrations protesting and demanding
that the Missions comply with their role. The budget
for Mercal is so precarious that each day it decreases
the supply of food at subsidized prices. Barrio Adentro
is disintegrating, and partly because Cuba alleges that
its medical personnel has to go to Bolivia, and partly
because the patients consider that the service provided
are not at all satisfactory. Vivienda lacks resources
to build houses promised by the President, some party
men, have been able to talk to him and denounce that
they are still living in slums. The current budget does
not provided for salaries in the public administration
or for the payment of pensions in the Social Insurance
Institute. The question is what will be the response
from the most needed population upon noting that the
government can not resolve what was promised by the
President. Those who foresee social explosions fueled
by the government’s propaganda that the country has
enough resources to affront the crisis and to guarantee
compliance of the social policies, specially the
Missions, are not exaggerating.
On May 1st., as it is his tradition, Chavez
will decree a salary increase. The workers ask for a
40% increase in all of the salary scale, to partially
compensate the magnitude of the increase in consumer
prices. As per the calculations from Finances, the
increase may not exceed 30%. It is evident that the
increase will have to be met with new taxes, devaluation
of the currency or the emission of inorganic money. To
turn to the international markets for credit would be
useless since the risk level has reached its historical
maximum. Any of those measures, or other similar ones
suppose more inflation, and as such, they will affect
the acquisition capacity of the population. The
government demands to postpone the discussion of
collective contracts, which is not accepted for those
who work in public services. They frequently protest in
public demonstrations and threaten with strikes. As a
paradox, it is the oil workers who the loudest are
regarding their claims, since they had been granted a
56% increase. The Rector of the Catholic University
Andres Bello (UCAB), states that Chavez knows how to
confront difficulties, work tirelessly and hold on tight
to power, but he does not know how to govern. It is the
tragedy of the country.
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