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October 16th., 2009

Chavez wants to call for early elections


Chavez is on election campaign. He insists on obtaining an absolute majority in the National Assembly (NA). This is the information that signals to a coming election, and he will be the only one to determine the date. Official sources say that elections for the NA will be in the first week of December, but management of the electoral authorities allows them to set any date or replace the parliamentary ones by a Constituent Assembly. His interest, say opponents, is to have a submissive parliament that allows him to remain as head of state beyond 2011, date when according to Constitutional provisions; the Presidential elections should be carried out. Based on that objective, the event and date will be of his convenience. The climate of public opinion and the economic situation are determining factors. All surveys, including the government ones, show a growing dissatisfaction with the government’s performance. The level of support for Chavez is weakening, even in sectors that traditionally have had affinity towards him. Analysts say the tendency shifts to an expansion of the rejection of the government.

 

Chavez appeals to his main political tool: public expenditure. For 2010, he approved a 2010 a budget of $ 80,000 million. His minister of finance estimates an oil production of 3,100,000 b / d. According to independent analysts actual production revolves around 2,700,000 b / d, from which domestic consumption and supply to Petrocaribe and Cuba should be deducted. There are 1,100,000 b / d actually sold. To balance the public expense, a price close to $ 100 p / barrel would be necessary. PDVSA, which debt is $ 40,000,000,000, is issuing Petro bonds, to pay salaries and contractors. They are quoted at 50% of their value. The total public debt exceeds $ 100,000,000,000 and the policy of acquiring more debt to cover anticipated costs, encounters a saturated market, with little space for bonds. The government’s last resolution is to impose Banks mandatory credit installments to certain sectors, if not, severe fines. The banks claim not to be able to fulfill them.

 

 Public opinion and economic scenario will move Chavez; it is said, to call for early elections in the first semester of the year. This would be possible because of the strict control he has over all National institutions, including the National Electoral Council (Consejo Nacional Electoral, CNE). For that purpose, the Suffrage Law has been reformed, which, among other things, prevents the representation of civil society and incorporates PSUV activists as members of the CNE, notwithstanding the fact that the National Constitution expressly prohibits it. The democratic sectors threaten with a large national front and united nominations being aware that they will face a scenario of scandalous opportunism and increased violence against all dissent. Chavez is prepared to survive the revolution at any price. He believes he relies with the military unconditionally.

 

ARMED FORCES AS PRAETORIAN GUARD

 

 The reform of the Organic Law of the National Armed Forces (Ley Orgánica de la Fuerza Armada Nacional, LOFAN) and a new Law on Military Conscription (Ley de Conscripción Militar, LCM), approved in an autocratic way, behind public opinion and the military institution itself, "legalizes" the transformation of the army into a praetorian guard. The distinction of "Bolivarian" has been added to the Armed Forces in violation of the Constitution and notwithstanding that such proposal was rejected by the referendum in December 2007. Now the operating of an armed body "the Bolivarian Militia” has been authorized, formed by the "territorial militia" and the "bodies of combatants”. The Militia becomes an armed unit, the fifth component of the Armed Forces. In 2005, Chavez justified the militia as a body in charge of retraining reservists, i.e., those who have undergone the military service, giving them a complementary nature of the Armed Forces in case of conflict. The novel bodies of combatants – according to the reform - are units made by those working in public or private institutions, registered, organized and trained "to assist in the overall defense of the nation”. This organization given to the Militia turns it not only in an armed unit, to the level of the ground, naval and air forces, but as the armed wing of the revolution, with its own budget, and reporting directly to the President. It is empowered to carry on intelligence work in public and private agencies, and in community councils. The admission process in the Militia will make reference to a regulation that will be issued by Chavez, ensuring, obviously, a thorough political filtering to ensure an armed body absolutely committed to his regime.

 

The reform copies the Cuban model and facilitates the members of the Bolivarian Liberation Forces (paramilitary, formally illegal) to join the fifth component. It also opens doors to participation of foreign military or civilians, in the armed forces. The LCM requires registration, from 15 to 60 years old to undergo military training. According to analysts the new legislation has geopolitical content which shatters frontiers and would allow creation of the Armed Forces of ALBA, suggested by Chavez. Taking into consideration that hypothetically the armed forces of Cuba and Venezuela could be integrated, they could be one of the strongest in the Continent. This could be one of the reasons for the increase of the arms race in Latin America.

 

The military condition of his government is increasingly evident. Between his trusted collaborators, 2,200 come from barracks and are in charge of monitoring, supervise and coerce the civilian bureaucracy. The military character of the government, backed up by the predominance of the Military within the public administration, affects the violation of human rights, as affirmed by a specialist on defense and national security. Chavez does not allow the American Commission on Human Rights to visit the country to investigate the many reports of continuous serious violations in recent years. The student movement is generating an intense campaign in favor of the presence of the IACHR. One of its leaders asked the following:  "If they have nothing to hide, why not allows the Commission to come?” The regime's response was that they will not allow the Commission to visit the country while they form part enemies of the Bolivarian revolution. The Venezuelan frontiers are closed to any inspection on the regarding the matter, to the point that senior officers of Human Rights Watch were violently expelled for having entered the country for a reading, in a press conference, of a report on the Venezuelan situation.

 

 OBJECTIVE: TO MAINTAIN THE TENSION IN THE REGION

 

The outrageous anti-American speech is a fundamental axis of the Bolivarian revolution. National and foreign analysts who study the case of Venezuela agree on this. Michael Shifter, from Interamerican Dialogue, spoke recently at a forum in Caracas, and expressed that Obama is always informed about the Venezuelan situation, but has no time for the region, due to serious domestic problems and the tasks demanded by foreign policy. "He can only deal with Mexico and Brazil”. Washington is not concerned about Chavez's rhetoric, as long as he guarantees a significant share of oil consumption. Europe is doing good business with Chavez and is little concerned about his governance methods. Spain is an exception, not by its government but by its great press, wherein they often warn of the danger of diminishing Chavez¨ support to the Colombian drug-guerrillas and his commitment to fuel conflicts that maintain tension in the South American region.

 

In the Caracas´ diplomatic circles, there is word that during the recent visit from the President of Ecuador, Chavez warned him that he did not approve of his reconciliation with Colombia and reiterated him his willingness to continue giving him support. Accordingly, he donated 6 Mirage 50, that were supposedly out of service. The issue aroused controversy. Correa explained that as informed by Chavez, the planes were completely rebuilt and re-powered. "The observations on the donation respond to the interests of those who want to separate the two countries. We have enemies who try to break our unity”. He denied that the donation involves a military alliance, but asked what would be wrong with such an agreement with a sister republic? The Colombian press states that the Mirage will be incorporated into the Ecuadorian Air Force.

 

Chavez keeps the relations with Colombia frozen, to the extent that trade has fallen to very low levels, with serious damage to both countries. According to El Tiempo of Bogota, Chavez´ political party will be launched in Colombia in January, to participate in parliamentary and presidential elections. It is the second phase - he says - of a settlement plan in Colombia of Chavez's ideology, which began in Cucuta, where 16 additional head offices are coordinated, located in major cities. Uribe is aware that Chavez supports such activities. In Alo Presidente, and in the state television opinion programs and in those of his closest peers, such as the one of Jose Vicente Rangel, it has been reiterated that officials and Colombian paramilitaries have been involved in the assassination attempts. "Colombia is a drug-state", is a slogan that remains in the regime. The governments of the Zulia and Tachira states argue that the border is an area of relief for the drug guerrilla and Venezuelan private investigators say that they have paid major sums of money to FARC representatives in order to free the family members that have been kidnapped.

 

Chavez's policy of establishing the so-called "foundation of peace" in the region has provoked serious reactions from different governments, such as Peru, Guatemala and Costa Rica. Oscar Arias said his country would not admit a future interference from Chavez in the internal affairs of Costa Rica.

DEMOCRACIA Y DESARROLLO
Presidente: Pedro Pablo Aguilar
P.O. Box International 02-5225
Miami, FL 33102-522
Fax: (52-212)267-2420